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The Historical Uniqueness of the Clinton Welfare
Reforms: A New Level of Social Misery?
LARRY PATRIQUIN
Nipissing University
This essay argues that the 1996 reforms to the American welfare state have
no historical precedent. They are not a return to "the poorhouse era" and
are radically distinct from Great Britain's new poor law of 1834, to which
they are often compared. America is the first advanced capitalist country
to jettison a significant element of its welfare state and, as such, is moving
into waters that are uncharted and dangerous.
The United States is implementing major "reforms" in an
effort to realize President Bill Clinton's 1992 election pledge "to
end welfare as we know it." The response of numerous observers
has been to provide trenchant critiques of these policy changes.
What is worrying about many of these commentaries, though, is
that they often maintain that Clinton's alterations to the welfare
system will bring America "back to the poorhouse era." This is a
flawed analysis which fails to recognize the basic empirical fact
that the heart of this legislation is historically unprecedented and
that, as a consequence, the cutbacks to welfare will bring about
a new level of social misery, in the process lowering the quality
of life for millions of people. My sole objective here is to make
this point. After a brief survey of the recent changes to social
assistance, this article will go on to challenge mainstream theories
of the origins of capitalism and welfare. This is a necessary step
in making a coherent case for the uniqueness of the reforms
currently unfolding in the U. S. Following this, an account will
be provided of Great Britain's new poor law of 1834, with the
objective of highlighting how this law is radically distinct from
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the Clinton reforms. The final section, an examination of the early
results of ending welfare "as we know it," provides grounds for
the pessimistic conclusions outlined here.
The Clinton Reforms
On August 22, 1996, President Clinton signed into law a
bill which overhauled the American welfare state (the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act). This
legislation contained a number of new measures, including:
1. The individual's right to cash assistance from the federal
government was abolished, replaced by a lifetime maximum of
five years in which a citizen can receive welfare benefits. People
are ineligible for monetary assistance after they reach this max-
imum, regardless of their demonstrated needs, though exemp-
tions for reasons of hardship and domestic violence are permitted
up to 20% of the caseload. States were also allowed to set their
own time limits. As a result, 20 states have limits that are shorter
than the federal government's-as low as 21 months in the case
of Connecticut. Twenty-eight states have opted for the 60-month
limit (Michigan and Vermont have no limit) (Schott, 2000, p. 1).
2. A crucial element of the American welfare state, Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), was eliminated. In
an attempt to devolve power, block grants (Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families-TANF) are now made to the states who run
their own programs, setting local standards and criteria (within
the guidelines set by the federal legislation).
3. The use of food stamps was restricted. For instance, an
unemployed individual or couple without children may receive
these coupons, which can be used to purchase groceries, for a
maximum of 90 days in any three-year period, extended to six
months if the recipient obtains and then loses a job. There are
no hardship exemptions to this rule. Countless people will be
denied what has always been their last defense against hunger.
"The Congressional Budget Office estimates that in an average
month, one million jobless individuals who are willing to work
and would take a work slot if one were available will be denied
food stamps under the new law" (Shaver, 1996, p. A10). In 1993,
28 million Americans depended on food stamps to make ends
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meet, more than 10% of the population. Ninety-two percent of
households receiving food stamps were below the federal poverty
line (Kuhn et al., 1996, p. 191). Families with children were pro-
jected to "absorb $18.4 billion-or about two-thirds--of the food
stamp cuts over six years," an annual average in 1998 of $435 per
recipient family ("The depth," 1996, p. 1).
4. People on welfare are required to work within two years
of receiving benefits or they will be removed from the rolls. An
exception here will be single mothers with young children. States
must have at least 50% of their able-bodied welfare recipients
working 30 or more hours per week by 2002, or else they face
financial penalties.
These "reforms" to the American welfare system are in some
ways old and, in one important respect, new. Among the former,
with a long history, are proposals to force individuals to work.
Indeed, the original scheme to employ people, the Bridewell in
London, England, was operating in the 1550s. Four and one-half
centuries later, it is clear that these endeavors have produced an
unbroken string of failures. Despite this, governments are still
trying to force the poor to earn their subsistence in a labor market
which, prior to welfare, had already rejected them.
What is new is that there has never been in any advanced
capitalist society an absence of social welfare for the poor, espe-
cially mothers and their children. There will, however, be such
an absence should time limits be enforced in the United States. In
order to draw out this point, it is necessary to move beyond the
standard interpretations of the history of capitalism.
The Origins of Capitalism
Capitalism is a social relationship that revolves around the
ownership (or non-ownership) of property. Here, the vast major-
ity of the means of production are held privately, monopolized
by a few individuals and removed from the direct control of the
community. Those without property are forced to sell their labor
power, their skills and abilities. In addition, the owners of capi-
talist businesses must compete against each other to bring their
products to market at the lowest cost, all else being equal. Prof-
its here have to be generated through increases in productivity.
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Capitalism also requires a distinct form of state, one which is
"separate from" and does not "intervene" in the private economy.
The state becomes solely a "political" entity Because exploitation
is now an "economic" affair, direct, government-orchestrated
coercion, which was necessary under feudalism, is no longer
required to "pump" a surplus out of workers (Wood, 1995, pp.
19-48).
The origins of this peculiar mode of production are often
carried deep into history, to the point where some writers see
any class-divided society as being "proto-capitalist." Max Weber,
for instance, argued that there were a number of different types of
capitalism (adventurer, pariah, rational, and so on), some of which
went back to the ancient world. More typical than this, however,
are the perspectives which attempt to account for the "rise of
Europe," developed in a number of closely related interpretations
by trade analysts, demographers, world-systems theorists, Webe-
rians, and some Marxists. They tend to see capitalism as having
its beginnings in the medieval period, produced as a result of a
timely combination of trade, markets, science, technology, urban-
ization, and western rationality (Wood, 1991). The main source of
disagreement among these analysts is over which elements of the
paradigm should receive the greatest emphasis as a causal factor
in the development of capitalism.
The problem with these approaches, however, is that they are
historically inaccurate. They all tend to take for granted the thing
that needs to be explained, namely the existence of capitalism.
For them, this novel mode of production is not really novel at
all, because it is always hidden somewhere in a social formation,
while at some point finally making a substantial quantitative leap
forward. Through a process of the removal of barriers, like those
that inhibit innovation or trade, economies simply "takeoff" and
grow into capitalism.
This drawback of glossing over what needs to be explained is
also evident in theories which assume that towns and cities, like
medieval Florence, were natural "breeding grounds" for capital-
ism. The argument here is that "commerce" developed in cities
where burghers (the bourgeoisie) were free to engage in business
activities in an environment which encouraged "economic ratio-
nality" and a Protestant work ethic. But in most of these urban
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centers, merchants gained their wealth in time-honored ways-
through the use of monopolies and coercive political, legal, and
military powers. There was nothing in
the traditional economic practices of burghers that would account
for the subjection of labour to capital, nothing in the rationality
of commercial profit taking that would explain how it came about
that all production became production for exchange and that direct
producers were compelled to enter the market in order to gain access
to their means of self-reproduction. And there is certainly nothing to
explain how production became subject to the imperatives of com-
petition, the maximization of surplus value and the self-expansion
of capital (Wood, 1995, pp. 164-5). 1
Mainstream theories on the origins of capitalism were chal-
lenged in the late 1970s by the American historian Robert Bren-
ner.2 Brenner began his investigations by accepting the presence
of non-capitalist class relations (typically landlords versus peas-
ants). He then asked the question: How could these have been
subverted? In what ways-and where and when-were these
first undermined? In other words, how did a relatively large
proportion of the means of production come to be controlled
in an absolute fashion by a small number of people in order
that the few could then employ the many? Framing the problem
this way, Brenner argued that it was the establishment, develop-
ment, and modification of class relations which was critical to the
transformation to capitalism. (This approach makes sense given
that capitalism is a class relation.) He concluded that this social
metamorphosis was not a "European" but a peculiarly English
event, rooted in the changing class structure of that nation's rural
areas, in particular its agriculture.
A basic definition of the origins of capitalism sees it as a
"type of economy and society which, in its developed form,
emerged from the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth cen-
tury in Western Europe" (Bottomore, 1993, p. 60). In contrast,
Brenner maintained that in the early modern era, it was only in
England that a relatively large proletariat was created as well as a
competitive market for agricultural goods. Peasants here did not
have secure access to land; they were, over time, unable to enforce
the customary (or traditional) methods of "owning" and farming
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common fields. Land became the exclusive private property of
a small group of landlords. In the middle of the class structure
were tenants who leased large farms from the lords, while wage-
laborers, who rounded out this "triad," did most of the actual
work. Leases to farms were removed from communal control and
subjected to the pressures of a competitive environment (in the
same way that paying rent today to maintain a lease for office
space requires that one's business be competitive in the "market
economy"). The result was that, over the course of a few centuries,
agriculture in England became a big, profit-oriented business.
The transformation on the land was clear by the 1790s when
England no longer had a significant peasantry. This made possible
the stunning Industrial Revolution that would unfold here in
the next seven or eight decades. The contrast with France is
illuminating, and the differences between these two countries
became much more notable as the nineteenth century progressed.
For example, in 1881, only 10% of Great Britain's gross national
product was being accounted for by agriculture, forestry, and
fishing. The figure for France was 41%. By the turn of the twentieth
century, the primary labor force in Britain constituted just 9% of
the total occupied population. It was 45% in France (Patriquin,
1996, pp. 109-15).
It is the fundamental differences in social relations which
serve as the foundation for these statistics. The English figures for
this period are unusual when compared to any other European
nation because they reflect the culmination of five hundred years
of a unique history which saw peasants become wage laborers.
A mass of people, with possession of land and access to common
rights (like collecting wood from the forests) were pushed off the
soil, not only as a result of coercive dispossession (enclosures),
but also because of economic pressures in a competitive environ-
ment produced by capitalist property relations. This occurred in
tandem with a government that was more and more becoming
separated from society (in contrast to, say, the absolutist state in
France). It is important, then, in an attempt to understand the
history of social welfare to see that this transition to capitalism
was well on its way to completion in England before it had hardly
even begun anywhere else in the world.
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Capitalism and the Origins of Welfare:
Poor Relief in England
Just as the story of capitalism has a standard version, so too
does the origins of the welfare state, which has "been traced back
to the creation of state-provided 'social services' in the aftermath
of nineteenth-century industrialization" (Briggs, 1993, p. 708).
An almost universally accepted description of the "phases of
welfare state development in western Europe" begins with a
"prehistory" (1600-1880); then moves to a "takeoff" (1880-1914);
an "expansion" (1918-1960); an "acceleration" (1960-1975); and
then a "slowdown" (after 1975) (Alber, 1988, p. 454). The driving
force behind the existence of welfare includes a number of fac-
tors, the importance of which may vary from one country to the
next. Foremost among these are thought to be "modernization,"
industrialization, urbanization, the development of trade unions,
the creation of working class political parties, and the influence
of democracy. Flora and Alber (1981, p. 48) suggest that this
prehistory of the welfare state can be divided into "the 'Poor
Law' period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries and the 'Liberal Break' of the nineteenth century." For
them, "the old European welfare states developed very similarly
during the poor law period," but "the liberal break produced
many divergences."
But let me suggest a different chronology-at least for the
first stage-and an alternative rationale for the existence of what
we generally understand as the "welfare state," an institution
which intervenes "deliberately to limit or to modify the conse-
quences of the free operation of market forces in circumstances
where individuals and families... [are] confronted with social
contingencies deemed to be largely beyond their control, notably
unemployment, sickness and old age" (Briggs, 1993, p. 708). The
list of "phases" noted above, especially the "prehistory," suffers
from a lack of recognition of how very different English social
policy was from the rest of the Continent in the early modern
era. Indeed, if we are to understand what is new about the attack
on income support in the U. S., it is necessary to focus on the
origins of welfare in England. For almost three hundred years,
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this country was the only one in Europe to have a substantial
system of poor relief.
In response to socio-economic changes in England, from the
1570s right down to the twentieth century, compulsory taxes
were established in local parishes with the funds collected being
distributed to individuals who could demonstrate sufficient need.
The relief provided to the poor in a typical parish after 1600 tended
to be a cash payment, which was always and everywhere more
significant than in-kind benefits, probably because handing out
money was easier to administer. Disbursements usually took the
form of a pension, paid weekly or monthly to the elderly, the
disabled, and widows with children. Cash payments were also
granted to provide short-term assistance to the "casual poor,"
such as those who were ill for a brief period and the able-bodied
unemployed. This assistance was not insignificant. By 1800, just
over 2% of Gross National Product (GNP) was being spent on
poor relief in England, an equivalent in the United States in the
late 1990s of roughly $160 billion.
This is in stark contrast to the types of social welfare which
from early modern times existed in Ireland, in Scotland, and on
the Continent. These were, for the most part, located in urban
areas, where a small minority of the population lived. They were
rooted in voluntary Christian charity and dispensed relatively
negligible amounts of assistance to those in extreme necessity.
This philanthropy (usually food) was ad hoc, distributed in par-
ticular during periods of crisis brought on by hunger and disease.
Relief here was paltry, and it did not contribute much to the
well-being of the poor. The types and value of assistance, as well
as the treatment, classification, and "discrimination" among the
needy differed little from one city to the next or from one religion
to another. Typically, "poor law" initiatives throughout Europe
prospered for a few years and then disappeared. Workhouses
and houses of correction were built here and there, occasionally
paid for with the funds generated by taxation. However, for
the most part, states tended to avoid becoming involved in the
administration of relief. In almost all of western Europe, down
to the late nineteenth century, the government's role was lim-
ited to little more than the coordination of the work of private
charities.
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England was different from everyone else because the provi-
sions for the poor here were linked to the emergence of capitalism.
As noted, beginning in the sixteenth century, England-and only
England-witnessed significant changes in social relations which
would over the next three hundred years produce agrarian and
then industrial capitalism, and create a landless proletariat, obli-
gated to sell its labor power. This kind of economic transformation
did not occur in the rest of Europe until much later, generally after
the 1800s. England was an exception to the historical story that
played itself out in the nations of western and eastern Europe in
the early modern period. Creating capitalism in a world where
it did not yet exist required the consolidation of land into a few
hands; the abolition of the collective management of property; the
destruction of common rights (which were, in effect, peasants'
rights); the commodification of labor power so that it could be
bought and sold on a free market; the development of an impera-
tive which forced producers to compete against one another; and
the rise of a unique "pro-capitalist" state, one that was involved
in exploitation, not as a parasite on the backs of an impoverished
peasantry, but as one that instituted policies and practices which
encouraged the production and reproduction of the capital-labor
relation. These social transformations occurred in England much
earlier and to a much greater degree than they did elsewhere.
This is the main reason why, for roughly three centuries, elabo-
rate arrangements for relieving the poor existed only in England.
Poor relief was instituted here because the people were "in need"
for a different reason than the poor elsewhere. The basis of English
indigence was the near total lack of "ownership" of land among
a substantial number of individuals. In contrast, the source of
poverty in other countries was inefficient methods of produc-
tion, which were rooted in a system of peasant-based property
relations and absolutist states. This socio-economic form had the
general support of ruling classes who wanted to keep people on
the land and hence maintain the social arrangement that was
the source of their own wealth. Hence, these nations had only
a sprinkling of private charities because, unlike England, they
did not have significant masses separated from the means of life.
In non-capitalist societies, peasants and slaves have their
physical existence assured by the social relations of production,
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except during extreme times like famine. However, with capi-
talism, reproduction of the individual depends on the repeated
completion of a transaction that is far from guaranteed, namely
selling one's labor power. This is why from the sixteenth century
onward the English state provided funding to people when they
were in need. Individuals would receive money from the public
coffers, provided for the most part by the nation's aristocracy,
without supplying any work in return. This was the most efficient
means of keeping them alive.
The chronology of welfare state development, then, runs
roughly as follows: From 1570 to almost the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, England-because it was the only country that was devel-
oping capitalist social relations-was the only country to have a
system of welfare that was comprehensive, national, government-
run, and supported from taxes placed on the ruling classes. In
the 1830s and 1840s, in Scotland and Ireland, large numbers
were being pushed off the land and into wage-paying labor, so
legislation was passed creating for them a modified version of the
English poor law. Near the end of the century, other countries such
as France and Germany, still with substantial peasantries, began
to slowly develop social assistance as they adopted the capitalist
mode of production. At the beginning of the twentieth century,
the nations of the "new world" such as the United States, Canada,
and Australia were running out of "frontier." Like their European
counterparts, they were forced to come to terms with the problems
created by a large, propertyless mass, especially in urban areas.
Historically, then, the creation of welfare states has followed the
development of capitalism the way a tail follows a dog.
In sum, capitalism has at no time operated without a signifi-
cant level of social assistance. Other nations basically reproduced
English poor relief in the last half of the nineteenth and the first
half of the twentieth centuries as part of the process of adopting
the English system of "free enterprise." Capitalism and social
welfare, in their emergence and development, have proceeded
closely along almost perfectly parallel lines. The "welfare state,"
from this perspective, has been an important component of cap-
italist societies, not since World War II, the Great Depression, or
Bismarckian Germany, but for somewhere on the order of three
or four hundred years.
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The Clinton Welfare Reforms:
The New Poor Law Revisited?
"Poor relief," the "provision for the needy," the "welfare
state"-or whatever we want to call it-has been deemed by the
owners of capitalist property, at least since late sixteenth century
England, to be in a "crisis." This constant "state of emergency'
has been declared ever since, part of the never-ending instability
of capitalism, a feature of socio-economic life that forces rulers
in all capitalist societies to deal incessantly with the question
of what is to be done with the unemployed and those on social
assistance. Indeed, the "crisis of the welfare state" is always, in
fact, a crisis of capitalism. Competition and the restructuring of
the capital-labor relation are at the core of this system. The result
is that any agreement between classes on the "rules of the game"
must always be fleeting, subject to dissolution on short notice,
with the least powerful members of society being made to bear
the brunt of any "retrenchment." In one sense, this is what is
happening in America today. Still, it is crucial to recognize that
the reforms being undertaken in the United States, especially
those pertaining to time limits on income maintenance, have no
historical counterpart. It is a mistake to see these changes in a
sequence of first, laissez faire; then the welfare state era; then
back to laissez faire again, as if there was some golden age of
capitalism which did not include the "millstone" of welfare, and
that the Clinton reforms are somehow going to restore this blissful
Garden of Eden. The dearest hope of neo-conservatives, their idea
that state support for poor people can be dismantled because
there was a time under capitalism when social assistance did not
exist, is based on a fundamental misreading of the origins of the
welfare state.
We need to challenge the view that "welfare states are scarcely
a hundred years old" and that they "tended to emerge in soci-
eties in which capitalism and the nation state were both already
well established" (Pierson, 1991, p. 103). This infers that welfare
followed capitalism, that it was added on at some later point by
liberal-minded politicians and civil servants, or because it was
a requirement of an "industrializing" economy The implication
here is that there was a time under capitalism when the state was
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not actively involved in supporting people. As noted, however,
welfare did not develop after capitalism but rather alongside it,
and it may have been a key factor in bridging the transition to this
new economy, grounded as it was in a radically distinct method
of exploitation.
Many commentators have incorporated this error into their
theories, declaring that the recent American proposals are the
kind that will bring us back to a mean-spirited form of capitalism,
when welfare (supposedly) did not exist. Frances Fox Piven (1996,
p. A17), an important scholar of the welfare state, has articulated
a version of this argument. She has suggested that the new poor
law in England in 1834 "eliminated relief for the poor" so that
//survival for the family meant entering prison-like workhouses."
Piven claimed that with the Clinton reforms, "the United States
government is eagerly following the 1834 script" and that Amer-
icans "may have to relive the misery and moral disintegration of
England in the 19th century to learn what happens when a society
deserts its most vulnerable members." William Kern (1998, pp.
430-1) maintained that the new poor law went as far as "eliminat-
ing relief to able-bodied persons unless they were inhabitants of
workhouses in accordance with the principle of 'less eligibility'."
He went on to say that the 1834 legislation "placed the entire
burden of provision for out-of-wedlock children entirely upon
the mother by denying them any claim upon parish assistance
or upon the father." In making the link from the new poor law
to the Clinton changes, he concluded that "contemporary wel-
fare reform thus represents a return to the same principles and
remedies that guided the reforms of 1834."
But this is a misinterpretation of the new poor law which most
definitely did not "eliminate" relief. Benefits were still available to
most categories of individuals, though often at a reduced rate, and
somewhere between 80% and 90% of recipients continued to be
relieved "outdoors" (that is, while living in their own residence).
In the decade or so after 1834, about 500 workhouses were built,
each with room for 250 to 300 people, but they generally continued
in their age-old role as places for the homeless, the elderly, the sick,
and orphans. Able-bodied males rarely entered these houses. In
1851, 78,000 people-43,000 children and 35,000 generally non-
able-bodied adults-were relieved indoors (and note that some of
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these would have stayed for short periods of time-they were not
"permanent" residents). In contrast, the following were relieved
outdoors: 51,000 able-bodied widows, 33,000 able-bodied men,
277,000 children, and 316,000 non-able bodied adults-a total of
677,000 individuals (Patriquin, 1996, pp. 118-24, based on data
from Williams, 1981).
The poor law report of 1834 saw outdoor relief to the able-
bodied male, and not outdoor relief in general, as the main problem
to be tackled. As such, the vast majority of those who could not
work, including the elderly and mothers with children, contin-
ued to receive the usual forms of assistance without entering a
workhouse. In the ten years after 1834, the central authorities
did issue a number of Prohibitory Orders against out-relief to
the able-bodied (generally understood as men who were able
to work). However, even these rules were not always enforced,
especially if withholding relief was "likely to produce serious evil
to the applicant" (The Prohibitory Orders, cited in Webb & Webb,
1929/1963, p. 146). Assistance to such individuals was often pro-
vided under the category of "exceptions," usually if the man or
his wife was ill or had suffered an accident. The inevitability of
continuing with a variation on past practices was acknowledged
in 1852 when, with reference to urban areas (accounting for three-
quarters of the population), the Poor Law Board said "that it is
'not expedient absolutely to prohibit Out-relief even to the able-
bodied'; and apparently [the Board] continued in that conviction
right through the century" (Webb & Webb, 1929/1963, p. 151,
citing the Prohibitory Orders). It was clear, then, as it always had
been, that it was cheaper to provide a small financial supplement
to people outdoors than the alternative of the workhouse.
The significant anti-poor law movement of 1837-38 was prob-
ably responsible for much of the continuity between the old and
new poor laws. It delayed the construction of workhouses in
northern England and southern Wales, ensured that local ar-
eas would continue to administer relief with some discretion,
and guaranteed that out-relief to the able-bodied would still
be granted in cases involving child care, old age, or severe hard-
ship. Organised opposition probably also contributed to the
fact that the workhouses never became heartless "Bastilles." The
food, clothing, and shelter provided by these institutions was
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comparable to that obtained by the poorest labourers on the
outside (occasionally they were even better). They were rarely
unsanitary and overcrowded. The workhouse was meant to serve
more the role of a psychological deterrent to the poor in their effort
to claim social benefits.
There is no doubt that under the new poor law assistance
to specific groups of people, especially able-bodied males, was
diminished. In the 1840s, the poor were subjected to increased
cutbacks, including lower levels of aid granted to those who lived
in their own homes (Dunkley, 1974). Access to assistance was
made more difficult in the larger poor law "unions," where an
individual might have to travel a few miles in order to make a
claim. Given this, many who needed relief would not (or could
not) apply. Other people, fearful of administrative intimidation,
preferred to suffer without protest rather than face the threat
of having to enter a workhouse. In some areas, the number of
applications for relief dropped quickly, and there are records of
occasional suicides, extreme hunger, and an increase in the selling
of goods to pawnbrokers (Apfel & Dunkley, 1985). Relief was
especially inadequate in places like Cumbria where handloom
weavers were making low wages as a result of short-time em-
ployment. Here, many individuals were close to starving to death
(Thompson, 1979).
Not every area of England and Wales was affected nega-
tively, but most certainly were. Total relief expenditures fell 28%
between 1834 and 1840 (Digby, 1989, p. 23). Between 1835 and
1851, the per capita amounts given to the poor decreased by 40%
(Huzel, 1989, p. 806). 3 The percentage of the population receiving
relief after 1834 also fell, due in part to much stricter require-
ments for assistance. In the years following the new poor law,
spending was halved as a percentage of gross national product,
from roughly 2% to 1% (Mokyr, 1993, p. 131).
Despite government attacks on poor relief, it still proved to be
an essential safety net for substantial sections of the population
in the second half of the nineteenth century. In one instance,
in Colyton, south Devonshire, 38% of male household heads
received relief from the rates at some point or other between
1851 and 1881 (Robin, 1990, pp. 196-7). Even during the peak
years of the Industrial Revolution, then, social assistance was a
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necessary form of support to countless individuals. Never was
this more evident then during the Lancashire "cotton famine"
in the early 1860s, when cotton could not be imported from the
southern United States because of the Civil War. An effect of this
was that many workers in Lancashire textile industries went on
short-time or were laid off, beginning around November 1861,
peaking at the end of the following year, and continuing into
1863. In December 1862, well over a quarter of a million people
were receiving relief here, the greatest pressure ever placed on the
resources of the poor law. When layoffs occurred, people would
first use up their small savings and then pawn whatever goods
they had. But these expedients could keep a family afloat for a few
weeks at most, seen by the fact that the relief rolls soared within
a month or two after a rapid increase in unemployment. In poor
law unions that had the greatest number of adults working in the
cotton industry, the proportion of the population receiving relief
went from a range of 1% to 3% in September 1861 to 11% to 26%
by November 1862 (Boyer, 1997, p. 62).
As for the non-able bodied, there was little change in their
treatment in the decades after 1834. They were served by the
larger workhouses which endured in the role of multi-purpose
centers that cared for those who could not care for themselves. The
Medical Officer to the Poor Law Board commented in 1868 that
the individuals "who enjoy the advantages of these institutions
are almost solely such as may fittingly receive them, viz. the aged
and infirm, the destitute sick and children. Workhouses are now
asylums and infirmaries" (cited in Webb & Webb, 1929/1963,
p. 356). This system was to slowly evolve in the next sixty or
seventy years into one where boys and girls were to be educated
in schools, while the sick and the elderly were gaining access to
hospitals and homes, often outside the sphere of the poor laws.
In sum, there was not much distinction in the practice or the
ideology of the relief systems under the old and new poor laws. In
both instances, the preservation of life was paramount, though of
course officials also used the rules of administration "as a means
of getting rid of applicants for relief at the least possible cost
in time, trouble and expense to themselves and the ratepayers"
(Rose, 1966, p. 620). Ideas like "less eligibility" (making sure that
work pays better than welfare) were hardly distinct; they go back
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to the beginnings of the poor law in the 1500s. There was certainly
greater enthusiasm among rulers for less eligibility. It had forceful
advocates in the writings of the political economists, especially
T. R. Malthus, who wanted to eliminate poor relief entirely The
1834 legislation did introduce some novelties in relief practices, in
particular the end of family "allowances" for children (where the
father was employed). Nevertheless, one could legitimately view
the new poor law as "no more than an extension of an established
method, devised and revised from time to time in order to care for
and discipline the various classes of poor people [in England]"
(Martin, 1972, p. 40).
The Clinton Welfare Reforms:
A New Level of Social Misery?
In contrast to the new poor law, abolishing most assistance to
those with the greatest levels of privation is what the American
proposals would do. Many analysts do not seem to recognize
the uniqueness of the Clinton reforms, and how these have the
potential to be harmful in the extreme. Destitute people in the
United States will not receive "out-relief." They will not even
have the option of entering a workhouse. They will simply be
homeless and hungry. The policies currently being implemented
are novel in their attempt to cut off significant benefits to those
in need and so is the attempt to abolish the rights which allow
individuals to claim some assistance. These proposals could mark
the first instance of Malthus' crudest recommendations having
come to fruition, and only time will tell us what kind of initiatives
are embarked upon by people who have been denied access to
the basic necessities of food, clothing, and shelter, while residing
in a nation of enormous wealth and abundance. The responses
could range from violent protest to quiet resignation. It is im-
possible to predict what actions people will take. One outcome
we should anticipate, though, is that these reforms will generate
levels of social misery not seen since the Great Depression of
the 1930s.
The early implementation of the Clinton reforms is far from
encouraging. For example, by mid-1998 in Connecticut (the state
with the lowest time limit), many of those cut off welfare were
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reapplying to get back on the rolls ("Welfare time limit," 1998, p.
B8). This has happened, and will continue to happen, because
those pushed off assistance are not earning enough to enable
them to procure their basic sustenance. A study of those who
left welfare in New York City between July 1996 and March 1997
counted as "working" anyone who made at least $100 in the three
months after welfare. By this extremely restrictive definition, it
found that only 29% had obtained "employment." The figure was
just 20% for the mostly single men who had been moved out of
the Home Relief Program (Hernandez, 1998, pp. Al, B6).
A lack of proper housing is another problem that welfare
reform has not solved. A survey in New Jersey found that, for
those who had left welfare in 1997, in the year following, fully half
had "experienced serious housing problems and been evicted,
forced to stay in homeless shelters or moved in with friends
or family members" (Kocieniewski, 1999, p. B6). As part of its
attempt to abandon welfare, this state tried to place a maximum
lifetime limit of 12 months in which a person could dwell in
an emergency shelter. However, it was forced to grant a mass
exemption to the 2,200 potentially homeless individuals living in
these shelters when they hit the limit in July 1998 ("As welfare
rolls drop," 1998, p. B5).
Cutbacks are also exacerbating hunger. In 1999, food stamps
were used by 18.2 million Americans, down from 27.5 million in
1994, with only one-third of the drop being accounted for by the
"good" economy (Belsie, 2000, p. 1). In many cases, individuals
are not collecting benefits they are entitled to receive. For example,
in 1994, "some 97 percent of Wisconsin's poor families used food
stamps; by 1998, 70 percent did" (Belsie, 2000, p. 1). Here, "after
leaving welfare, families were almost 50 percent more likely to say
they had no way to buy groceries," in a state where 5% of former
recipients have been forced to abandon their children (DeParle
1999, p. A21).1 In Missouri, food stamp use fell 25% between
1996 and 1998, even though there were 29,000 more poor people.
Zedlewski and Brauner (1999, p. 3) note that "only about half
of former welfare recipient families with current incomes below
50 percent of the poverty level were receiving food stamps,"
with about 30% of this group having left the program because
of "administrative problems or hassles." Meanwhile, the need for
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assistance remains, since about "two-thirds of families that left the
Food Stamp program reported some difficulty affording food, and
one-third reported severe difficulties" (Zedlewski and Brauner,
1999, p. 3). Commenting on the final data for 1997, the General
Accounting Office concluded that there is now "a growing gap
between the number of children in poverty-an important indi-
cator of children's need for food assistance-and the number of
children receiving food stamp assistance" (cited in "Fewer food,"
1999, p. 3). This has led to an increasing dependence on charity
food use, which was up 18% across America between 1998 and
1999 (Mehren, 2000). However, charities are failing to meet the
excessive demand placed on their limited resources. In cities like
Chicago, food banks are turning away one million residents per
year (Belsie, 2000, p. 1).
By September 1998, welfare rolls had declined by 42% since
1994, from 14.3 million individuals to 8 million. This was achieved
partly by extending two longstanding procedures: Cutting people
off benefits and making it more difficult for those in need to
gain access to programs. A headline in the New York Times from
March 1999 (Janofsky) says it all: "West Virginia pares welfare, but
poor remain." Here, thousands of people now "depend on free
community services for the barest essentials" (Janofsky, 1999, p.
20), in a state where charity breakfasts and lunches, free health
clinics, and shelters for women are bursting at the seams. And
all of this is occurring before the enforcement of time limits in
most states.
Once we move beyond uncritical government rhetoric and
mainstream media cheerleading, the results of welfare reform are
unambiguous-continued and increasing hunger, homelessness,
unemployment, and poverty. There are virtually no "good news"
stories here. But is this reason to be pessimistic? Are there other
areas of the welfare state that can pick up where AFDC/TANF
have left off?
One other major program providing cash benefits to the poor,
in addition to welfare, is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).
The EITC is a refundable tax credit that is delivered to about
19 million working households, mostly those with children. The
final expansion of the E1TC, legislated in 1993, was fully phased in
by 1996. With this, the "number of children removed from poverty
Historical Uniqueness 89
due to the combined effect of federal income and payroll taxes
and the [offsetting] EITC increased to 1.2 million" (Greenstein &
Shapiro, 1998, p. 8). This, however, is a relatively modest number
and, barring improvements, we should not expect the program
to contribute to further reductions in poverty. When population
growth and inflation are taken into account, the benefits of the
EITC are expected to decline at an annual rate of 0.7% between
1998 and 2003 (Greenstein & Shapiro, 1998, p. 10). In addition,
while providing some support for families, the program provides
little to individuals without dependents. These people received
a maximum annual credit in 1997 of $332 (with an average of
$186). Their benefits accounted for just 3% of total EITC outlays
(Greenstein & Shapiro, 1998, p. 5). Most importantly, the EITC is
a work supplement. It does not provide any assistance to those
who are completely unemployed, nor does it address the issue of
the absence of an adequate number of well-paying jobs.
The states do have some options in the face of time limits. The
final TANF rules, which took effect October 1999, have placed a
cap on what is called "assistance," defined as "benefits and ser-
vices that serve the same purpose as a welfare check-helping a
family meet basic needs on an ongoing basis-[these] are counted
against the family's time limit" (Schott, et al., 1999, p. 2). Services
to employed families, such as child care and transportation, are
not counted. States may also provide short-term crisis assistance
for up to four months (with some room for extensions). This is
not counted toward the time-limit if it is assistance that is "not
intended to meet an ongoing or recurrent need" (Schott, et al.,
1999, p. 3). This evidently points to emergency funding only. It
is not meant to be an "out" for those who have reached their
limit. Another factor which may save some people from impov-
erishment is that all states "must spend an amount equal to at
least 80 percent of the amount they spent in fiscal year 1994 on
AFDC-related programs" in order to receive their federal TANF
grants (Schott, et al., 1999, p. 14). But this entails ever smaller
expenditures (as a result of inflation) on a rising population, in
a context where government is placing an emphasis on expen-
sive welfare-to-work programs which are much more costly than
straightforward welfare, and hence can handle the demands of a
smaller fraction of those in need.
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States can also provide their own assistance through "main-
tenance-of-effort" (MOE) funds, given to individuals who have
gone beyond the TANF limits and who form part of the group that
is in excess of the 20% caseload exemption (the 20% exemption
can be covered by federal TANF monies). However, almost all
states have placed time limits on the receipt of MOE funds, even
though they were not required to do so by the federal government
(Schott, 2000, pp. 1-3). States like New York and Connecticut have
also developed "Safety Net" programs that provide extremely
small amounts of cash and limited basic assistance in the form of
vouchers for rent and utilities to those who have exhausted their
TANF eligibility.
Based on the characteristics of social assistance recipients in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, it has been estimated that up to
41% of the current welfare caseload (roughly 2 million families)
will hit the maximum five-year time limit within eight years
(Duncan, Harris & Boisjoly, 2000, pp. 63, 68). In places where
the time limit is two years, 69% of the caseload will reach the
limit within five years. By June 2000,60,000 families had lost their
TANF benefits because they had hit the welfare wall (Schott, 2000,
p. 1). The eagerness with which many states have embraced time
limits suggests that these will be rigorously enforced, hence the
small number now permanently banished from welfare will rise
dramatically. Removing the lifetime maximums, or expanding
them to a level (say 12 to 15 years) where they are virtually
pointless, is always a possibility. However, this would mean that
many politicians would have to renounce the heart of the TANF
legislation-with its emphasis on temporary support and ending
welfare "as we know it." The Republican victory in the 2000
presidential election makes such backtracking highly unlikely.
Given this, the Clinton reforms will in the not too distant
future push millions of Americans to the brink, leaving them with
severely diminished physical and mental health. They will have
to subsist on a combination of gifts from friends and relatives,
temporary work for small amounts of cash, charity, theft, pros-
titution, drug-dealing, and other illegal activities. A few may be
entitled to vouchers for food or housing, though access to this
assistance is being tightly restricted. If the social edifice looks
like it may be dented, remedial legislation can always revoke the
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harsher aspects of these reforms. However, the suffering inflicted
on America's "underclass" will likely be significant if govern-
ments stand by the time limits for income support-and recall
that, unlike England's new poor law, this is the explicit intent of
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.
Capitalist systems have maintained some form of social as-
sistance, especially for mothers and their children, going back
to the origins of this mode of production in sixteenth-century
England. The United States will soon become the first capitalist
country to jettison the central core of state support for its poorest
citizens. These individuals will not be helped by welfare nor
will they be rescued by capitalist labor markets. The necessity to
maximize profits and the "boom and bust" of the business cycle
have not disappeared with the advent of the "new economy."
The competitive imperative built into the system is responsible
for periodic crises. "Overproduction," where markets are glutted
and companies cannot sell their goods, eventually leads to falling
revenues and worker layoffs. Economic slumps in the last two
decades have proven to be deeper and more devastating than
those in the "golden years" of the post-War era (1945-1975). In the
1990s, most countries experienced record low levels for profits,
wages, output, government spending, and job creation. The next
recession, in a world that is more "global" than ever, will likely
be as bad or worse. Given the inevitable downturn that will run
its course in the next few years, combined with welfare "reform,"
America could soon move into waters that are uncharted and
potentially dangerous.
Notes
1. See also Holton (1986, pp. 61-2) who concluded that "the notion 'town air
makes free' is for the most part an over-inflated piece of historical mythology
of relatively minor significance in the explanation of capitalist development."
2. Brenner's major works are collected in Aston & Philpin, (Eds.). (1985).
3. To put this in perspective, AFDC average payments per recipient fell 35.3%
(in constant dollars) in the 48 contiguous states between 1975 and 1995, from
$184 to $119 (Wexler and Engel, 1999, pp. 46-7).
4. This article noted that "surveys like these tend to underestimate the actual
amount of hardship since the most troubled people are the hardest to find"
(p. A21).
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